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Note 
 
Coerced into Health: Workplace Wellness 
Programs and Their Threat to Genetic Privacy 
Julia Wolfe 
“It’s Official: Employee Wellness Is a ‘Scam.’”1 “Workplace 
Wellness Programs May Cost More than They’re Worth.”2 
“Workplace Wellness Programs Are a Sham.”3 These are just a 
few of many headlines suggesting a backlash against the work-
place wellness programs that have proliferated under the Afford-
able Care Act (ACA). Now, it is not uncommon for employers of 
all sizes to ask workers to undergo health assessments and in-
centivize healthy eating and exercise through rewards like gift 
cards, discounted gym memberships, and health insurance re-
ductions. These programs are certainly attractive in theory: 
What employer would not want to have a healthier, more pro-
ductive workforce, lower healthcare costs, and play a role in solv-
ing this country’s persistent obesity epidemic? And what em-
ployee would not want a significant reduction in their health 
insurance premiums and other rewards in exchange for staying 
healthy? After all, the ACA’s encouragement of these programs 
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husband, Jason Eckmann, for giving me the idea to write about GINA and his 
patience throughout this process, and to my parents, Sally Silk and Tom Wolfe, 
whose curiosity about the world and love of writing have always inspired me. 
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 1. Al Lewis, It’s Official: Employee Wellness Is a “Scam,” HUFFINGTON 
POST (Apr. 17, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/al-lewis/its-official 
-employee-wel_b_7046652.html. 
 2. Brianna Ehley, Workplace Wellness Programs May Cost More than 
They’re Worth, FISCAL TIMES (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/ 
2014/12/16/Workplace-Wellness-Programs-May-Cost-More-They-re-Worth. 
 3. L.V. Anderson, Workplace Wellness Programs Are a Sham, SLATE (Sept. 
1, 2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/the_ladder/2016/09/ 
workplace_wellness_programs_are_a_sham.html. 
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was one of the few provisions of the incredibly polarizing law 
that garnered bipartisan support.4 
However, seven years have passed since Congress enacted 
the ACA, and results are not so promising. Workplace wellness 
programs have generally proven to be ineffective at both making 
employees healthier and saving on healthcare costs.5 Perhaps 
even more troubling, though, are the opportunities these pro-
grams present for disturbing invasions of privacy. Few employ-
ees would probably welcome their employer’s knowledge of their 
weight fluctuations, cholesterol levels, and blood pressure. When 
hundreds or even thousands of dollars of annual savings on 
health premiums are at stake, however, many employees might 
find these programs hard to turn down. 
Particularly problematic is the potential for employers to 
gain access to genetic testing results and family medical history 
of employees, and even their spouses, who are on the same com-
pany-sponsored health plan. This risk brings wellness programs 
under the purview of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimina-
tion Act (GINA) of 2008,6 which Senator Edward Kennedy 
praised as “the first civil rights bill of the new century of life sci-
ences.”7 While responding to the United States’ legacy of a racist 
conception of genetics and the appalling practices accompanying 
it,8 GINA was a forward-looking law. It defines genetic infor-
mation to include both results of genetic tests and family medical 
history,9 which can reveal much about a person’s predisposition 
to diseases without any testing at all.10 Foreseeing dramatic ad-
vances in medicine and technology, it anticipated the risks such 
innovation could mean for employees and patients. Not only did 
 
 4. See Julia Belluz, A New Bill Would Allow Employers to See Your Genetic 
Information—Unless You Pay a Fine, VOX (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.vox 
.com/policy-and-politics/2017/3/13/14907250/hr1313-bill-genetic-information. 
 5. See Anderson, supra note 3. 
 6. Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008) (codified in scattered sections 
of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 7. David H. Kaye, GINA’s Genotypes, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRES-
SIONS 51, 51 (2010). 
 8. See generally Peter Blanck & Aisling de Paor, US Legislative and Policy 
Response: Some Historical Context to GINA, in GENETIC DISCRIMINATION: 
TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVES ON THE CASE FOR A EUROPEAN-LEVEL LEGAL 
RESPONSE 97 (Gerard Quinn et al. eds., 2015) (detailing the social, cultural, and 
historical background of genetic discrimination in the United States). 
 9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4) (2012).  
 10. Cf. Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Distrust, 91 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 757, 767 (2015) (describing how genetic testing can identify a 
“person’s likely health or medical predispositions”). 
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GINA join the important federal employment antidiscrimination 
statutes by outlawing the kind of genetic discrimination de-
scribed above, but it also represented a significant step in pri-
vacy law by prohibiting employers from even accessing employ-
ees’ genetic data in the first place.11 GINA similarly applies in 
the health insurance context to prevent discriminatory practices 
by insurers.12 
But what happens when well-intentioned wellness pro-
grams request genetic tests or family medical histories as part 
of their baseline Health Risk Assessments (HRA)? Just as em-
ployers offer perks like gift cards and subsidized gym member-
ships in exchange for wellness program participation, they have 
also incentivized disclosing this sensitive information through 
discounts on employees’ health premiums. The assumption be-
hind this practice is that knowledge of one’s genetic information 
can help predict risks of future illness and encourage appropri-
ate preventative behavior.13 Congress and government agencies, 
notably the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC), have decided that GINA’s privacy concerns should, to 
some degree, give way to the needs of voluntary wellness pro-
grams. To this end, the EEOC recently tried to decide by regula-
tion at what point an incentive for lower health insurance pre-
miums in exchange for such information crosses the line from 
voluntary to coercive. The agency concluded that any discount 
amounting to less than thirty percent of the employee’s premi-
ums kept a program within the definition of “voluntary.”14 The 
rules also tried to make the complex regulatory framework in-
volving GINA, the ACA, the American with Disabilities Act 
(ADA), the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 
and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) more consistent, with mixed results. 
 
 11. See Abigail Lauren Purdue, Justifying GINA, 78 TENN. L. REV. 1051, 
1068 (2011) (noting GINA’s broad definition of “requests” of genetic infor-
mation). 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 300 gg-53 (2012). 
 13. See Jennifer S. Bard, When Public Health and Genetic Privacy Collide: 
Positive and Normative Theories Explaining How ACA’s Expansion of Corporate 
Wellness Programs Conflicts with GINA’s Privacy Rules, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
469, 480 (2011). Scientific studies, however, have not necessarily supported this 
conventional wisdom. Id. at 480–81; see also infra notes 168–70 and accompa-
nying text. 
 14. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(b)(2)(iii) (2017). 
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There is both vigorous opposition to the EEOC rules and ar-
guments these rules did not go far enough. Employee and pri-
vacy rights advocates believe even a thirty percent incentive 
level is too coercive, while business and wellness program indus-
try interests suggest a rule like this one hinders employers’ free-
dom in crafting these programs.15 In fact, members of Congress 
have voted a bill out of committee that would expand these stat-
utes’ exceptions to encourage wellness program participation.16 
In December of 2017, a federal district judge ordered the rules 
vacated effective January 1, 2019. The judge reasoned that there 
appeared to be a real risk of coercion and the EEOC had not ex-
plained why it had set the maximum at thirty percent.17 With 
these divergent positions and the agency now back to the draw-
ing board, the issue of incentives, wellness programs, and ge-
netic information is far from settled. 
This Note explores whether some wellness programs’ ge-
netic information-sharing requirements conflict with the pur-
pose of GINA. Part I describes the problem of genetic discrimi-
nation, how GINA addresses it, and whether it is successful in 
doing so. Part II then examines wellness programs, both what 
they are and how they are regulated, especially in relation to 
how they must comply with GINA. Part II analyzes how finan-
cial incentives for disclosing genetic information amount to coer-
cion and render such a practice involuntary. Part III proposes 
that a zero-incentive rule would better advance GINA’s purpose 
and address the concerns that motivated this legislation. Ulti-
mately, financial incentives at any level amount to impermissi-
ble coercion because of the unique nature of genetics and intan-
gible risks related to genetic privacy. Instead, opportunities for 
genetic testing should be strictly optional, untethered from even 
minor reductions in health insurance costs. This new rule might 
even lead to more successful wellness program outcomes and 
would offer certainty to employers seeking clarity in this area of 
law. Since privacy is an important tool for antidiscrimination 
law18 and genetic privacy specifically deserves strong protec-
 
 15. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 16. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 17. AARP v. EEOC, 292 F. Supp. 3d 238, 243 (D.D.C. 2017). 
 18. Jessica L. Roberts, Protecting Privacy to Prevent Discrimination, 56 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2097, 2102 (2015) [hereinafter Roberts, Protecting Privacy] 
(“Antidiscrimination law prohibits discriminatory actions by outlawing certain 
types of conduct, but privacy law renders the offensive conduct practically im-
possible by impeding access to the information necessary for the unfavorable 
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tions, incentivizing these disclosures would substantially in-
fringe on GINA’s purpose. 
 
I.  EVOLUTION OF GINA AND WORKPLACE WELLNESS 
PROGRAMS   
GINA and wellness programs have separate and distinct 
backgrounds, but they become closely intertwined where well-
ness programs raise privacy concerns. To understand why well-
ness programs are highly problematic in this context, it is neces-
sary to understand GINA’s background, purpose, and how 
workplace wellness programs operate. This Part first details the 
history of genetic testing in the United States, the forces culmi-
nating in GINA’s enactment in 2008, the statutory provision re-
lated to employment, and what makes the law unique. This Part 
then describes the development of wellness programs, the vari-
ous laws they implicate, and the attempt at regulating their use 
of financial incentives for obtaining information protected by 
GINA. 
A. THE GENETIC INFORMATION NONDISCRIMINATION ACT 
1. Historical Background of Genetic Testing 
The United States has had a long, complicated, racist his-
tory of genetic discrimination. The idea of Social Darwinism 
helped give rise to the eugenics movement in the early 20th cen-
tury.19 Theories of biological worthiness and assumptions about 
undesirable traits like race and disabilities being passed on co-
incided with the sharp influx of immigrants into the United 
States.20 In 1927, the Supreme Court infamously gave its stamp 
of approval to the eugenics movement when it authorized forced 
sterilizations.21 Between 1907 and 1937, thirty-two states 
passed forced sterilization laws to control populations of “genet-
ically undesirable individuals.”22 
 
differentiation.”).  
 19. See Blanck & de Paor, supra note 8, at 98–100; see also MARK TAYLOR, 
GENETIC DATA AND THE LAW: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE ON PRIVACY PROTEC-
TION 4 (2012) (noting how the use of genetics for ill purposes is not limited in 
the West to the obvious example of Nazi Germany). 
 20. See Blanck & de Paor, supra note 8, at 98–100. 
 21. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). Interestingly, Buck has never been 
expressly overturned and is still good law. 
 22. Blanck & de Paor, supra note 8, at 99. 
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More recently, genetic discrimination and race have been 
closely linked since the discovery of African Americans’ genetic 
predisposition to sickle cell anemia in the 1970s.23 African Amer-
icans were barred from jobs, educational opportunities, and even 
insurance coverage if they carried a sickle cell gene mutation.24 
In fact, some states even passed laws requiring sickle cell test-
ing, and such tests could be a condition to obtain a marriage li-
cense or attend public school.25 The only genetic discrimination 
case to reach a federal court of appeals—both pre- and post-
GINA—concerned sickle cell testing. In Norman-Bloodsaw v. 
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, plaintiffs challenged their em-
ployer’s policy that new hires undergo medical exams, including 
blood and urine samples.26 Without their knowledge, the plain-
tiffs were tested for the sickle cell gene, in addition to syphilis 
and pregnancy.27 The Ninth Circuit reversed summary judg-
ment for the employer and remanded to the district court, find-
ing that there was at least a triable issue on the plaintiffs’ fed-
eral constitutional privacy claims.28 It suggested in dicta that 
this gross invasion of privacy violated the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection against unlawful searches.29 In fact, Norman-Blood-
saw and the racist history of genetic discrimination figured 
prominently in the congressional findings preceding GINA.30 
This case prompted the House of Representatives to state in its 
 
 23. Id. at 100. 
 24. Louise M. Slaughter, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act: 
Why Your Personal Genetics Are Still Vulnerable to Discrimination, 88 SURGI-
CAL CLINICS N. AM. 723, 726 (2008). 
 25. See Bradley A. Areheart, GINA, Privacy, and Antisubordination, 46 GA. 
L. REV. 705, 716 (2012); Philip R. Reilly, Laws to Regulate the Use of Genetic 
Information, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIAL-
ITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 369, 371 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997); Bahrad A. So-
khansanj, Note, Beyond Protecting Genetic Privacy: Understanding Genetic Dis-
crimination Through Its Disparate Impact on Racial Minorities, 2 COLUM. J. 
RACE & L. 279, 290 (2012). 
 26. 135 F.3d 1260, 1265 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 1270. The case settled before it could go to trial. Elizabeth Pendo, 
Race, Sex and Genes at Work: Uncovering the Lessons of Norman-Bloodsaw, 10 
HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 227, 246 (2010). 
 29. Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1269 (“[I]t goes without saying that the 
most basic violation possible involves the performance of unauthorized 
tests . . . [which] may also be viewed as searches in violation of Fourth Amend-
ment rights that require Fourth Amendment scrutiny.”). 
 30. H.R. REP. NO. 110-28, pt. 1, at 2 (2007). 
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report on GINA, “Congress clearly has a compelling public inter-
est in relieving the fear of discrimination and in prohibiting its 
actual practice in employment and health insurance.”31 
2. Motivations for Enacting GINA 
Prior to GINA and in addition to a patchwork of genetic non-
discrimination state laws,32 the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) came closest to a federal prohibition on genetic discrimi-
nation.33 The employment provision of the ADA, administered by 
the EEOC, offered some protection against employers’ inquiries 
about disabilities which might include medical exams. In EEOC 
v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co., the agency sued 
on behalf of employees filing for worker’s compensation who 
were required either to undergo medical tests that tested for ge-
netic markers of carpal tunnel syndrome, or face disciplinary ac-
tion if they refused.34 The EEOC settled for $2.2 million but 
noted “that the mere gathering of an employee’s DNA may con-
stitute a violation of the ADA.”35 
EEOC v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. high-
lighted a major blind spot of the ADA. The BNSF employees won 
because the test was for a specific disability that could have af-
fected their ability to work, thus falling under the purview of the 
ADA.36 By contrast, it was unclear whether the ADA could sim-
ilarly protect a plaintiff who was “denied employment based on 
a gene associated with risks of cancer or a future heart condition, 
 
 31. Id. at 883. 
 32. At the time of GINA’s enactment, over thirty states had some kind of 
law related to genetic discrimination, but GINA would provide a “federal ‘floor.’” 
Slaughter, supra note 24, at 735. Most of these state laws were much less ex-
pansive than GINA, protecting only against, for example, employment discrim-
ination against those with a sickle cell trait or not including family medical his-
tory under the definition of “genetic information.” See Mark A. Rothstein, 
Genetic Secrets: A Policy Framework, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRI-
VACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA, supra note 25, at 451, 476. 
 33. See Blanck & de Paor, supra note 8, at 105–06. 
 34. Agreed Order Settling the Lawsuit, No. 02-C-0456, 2002 WL 32155386, 
at *1 (E.D. Wis. May 8, 2002). 
 35. Press Release, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC and BNSF 
Settle Genetic Testing Case Under Americans with Disabilities Act, (May 8, 
2002), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/5-8-02.cfm. 
 36. KEN LEFEBVRE, GENETIC DISCRIMINATION LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: 
A SOCIOETHICAL & LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE GENETIC INFORMATION NONDIS-
CRIMINATION ACT (GINA), SCH. OF PUB. POLICY CAPSTONES, UNIV. OF MASS. 
AMHERST 14–15 (2015), http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=1039&context=cppa_capstones. 
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rather than a more specific disability.”37 In fact, prior to the set-
tlement with BNSF, the Commissioner of the EEOC acknowl-
edged this gap, imploring Congress to pass federal genetic anti-
discrimination legislation.38 
Rapidly advancing technology—notably the Human Ge-
nome Project—only exacerbated the concern that existing statu-
tory protections were inadequate. Specifically, Congress worried 
that the ADA was insufficient and that protection against ge-
netic discrimination itself should be codified.39 DNA tests were 
becoming cheaper, easier to conduct, and available to consumers 
by mail or through the internet.40 Moreover, this accessibility 
and sophisticated technology would improve exponentially with 
the lucrative financial rewards for companies engaged in this in-
dustry.41 
The concern was that “while these scientific advancements 
might alter the way in which we understand and treat disease, 
they would also create new ways to discriminate.”42 Surveys of 
Americans at this time revealed widespread fears about genetic 
testing. In 2006, two-thirds of survey respondents expressed 
“concerns about how their genetic information would be stored 
and who would have access to it.”43 About the same number wor-
ried about health insurers having unauthorized access to this in-
formation and slightly fewer feared their employers accessing 
it.44 Seventy-two percent believed there should be laws to protect 
genetic privacy, and even more agreed that employers would dis-
criminate in the absence of such legislation.45 With the increas-
ing complexity of the modern healthcare system, these fears 
were understandable even if they were not borne out, given that 
so many parties—insurers, specialists, and staff across hospi-
tals—typically have access to patients’ health information.46 
 
 37. Id. at 15. 
 38. See Blanck & de Paor, supra note 8, at 105–06.  
 39. Id. 
 40. See TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 58. 
 41. See id. at 59. 
 42. Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Ge-
netic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 63 VAND. L. REV. 439, 443 (2010) 
[hereinafter Roberts, Preempting Discrimination]. 
 43. Slaughter, supra note 24, at 726–27. 
 44. Id. at 727. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See generally Aaron Varner, Title II of the Genetic Information Nondis-
crimination Act and Its Promulgating Regulations: Analyzing Employer Acqui-
sition of Employee Genetic Information in the Context of Fairness and Privacy, 
62 LAB. L.J. 202, 205–06 (2011) (describing the complexities of the healthcare 
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These concerns can deter people from undergoing genetic testing 
and benefiting from early medical screenings and thus from suc-
cessful treatment, particularly for cancer.47 Others have admit-
ted to seeking out genetic testing through use of false names and 
addresses.48 While there are some measures researchers and in-
stitutions can take to anonymize the information, such efforts 
can only go so far.49 This reluctance among the public regarding 
genetic testing was also a concern for scientists.50 Potentially 
life-saving research depends on the public’s participation in sci-
entific studies and clinical trials, so avoiding these tests could 
hold back scientific progress.51 Consequently, GINA was also 
meant to encourage public participation in clinical research by 
assuaging fears about data sharing.52 
 
system and why federal laws are needed to protect patient and employee pri-
vacy). 
 47. See Slaughter, supra note 24, at 727. For example, the House of Repre-
sentatives report regarding GINA cites a study from 2003 of almost 500 people 
with a family history of colorectal cancer showing that almost half were very 
concerned about genetic discrimination and thus were reluctant to undergo ge-
netic testing or even to discuss it with their doctor. H.R. REP. NO. 110-28, pt. 1, 
at 28 (2007) (citing Donald W. Hadley et al., Genetic Counseling and Testing in 
Families with Hereditary Nonpolyposis Colorectal Cancer, 163 ARCHIVE INTER-
NAL MED. 573, 579 (2003)). 
 48. Slaughter, supra note 24, at 726. 
 49. See generally Sokhansanj, supra note 25, at 285–86 (discussing the dif-
ferent ways to prevent genetic data from being linked to specific individuals and 
these methods’ downsides). 
 50. See, e.g., Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2008: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Labor, Health & Human Servs., Educ., & Related Agencies of the S. 
Comm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong. 409 (2007) (statement of Dr. Francis S. 
Collins, Director, National Human Genome Research Institute, Department of 
Health and Human Services) (“[The National Human Genome Research Insti-
tute] remains concerned about the impact of potential genetic discrimination on 
research and clinical practice.”). 
 51. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-28, pt. 1, at 31 (2007) (“Fewer participants in 
genetic research lead to slower development of treatments, beneficial drugs, and 
cures.”); cf. Peter Aldhous, US Outlaws Genetic Discrimination, NEW SCIENTIST 
(Apr. 28, 2008), https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn13785-us-outlaws 
-genetic-discrimination (“With the passage of GINA, researchers and clinicians 
can actively encourage Americans to participate in clinical trials and appropri-
ate genetic testing.” (quoting the president of the American Society of Human 
Genetics)). 
 52. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 110-28, pt. 1, at 2 (2007); Varner, supra note 46, 
at 206. 
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3. Provisions of GINA 
After a thirteen-year road through Congress,53 GINA was fi-
nally enacted almost unanimously in 2008.54 There are two pro-
visions of the law, one prohibiting genetic discrimination in 
health insurance and the other in employment.55 GINA ad-
dresses both of these contexts because Congress recognized that 
the majority of Americans receive health insurance through 
their employer.56 Title I of the statute prohibits health insurers 
from collecting or requesting genetic information and making 
coverage determinations based on that data.57 HIPAA, enacted 
in 1996, already addressed this concern, but only in a limited 
way, so GINA significantly broadened HIPAA’s protections.58 Ti-
tle II makes it unlawful for employers to “request, require, or 
purchase genetic information with respect to an employee or a 
family member of the employee” and from using it in employ-
ment decisions such as hiring, firing, and promotions.59 This pro-
vision requires plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies 
through the EEOC just like the ADA and Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.60 The statute’s definition of genetic infor-
mation includes both genetic testing results of the individual and 
their family members as well as the individual’s family medical 
history.61 
GINA addressed some of the concerns arising after EEOC v. 
BNSF, which had made clear that the ADA’s scope of protection 
was not broad enough to cover genetic privacy.62 While the ADA 
restricts employers’ ability to inquire about employees’ observa-
ble, existing health conditions, GINA prohibits questions related 
 
 53. Blanck & de Paor, supra note 8, at 104. 
 54. The bill passed the Senate 95-0 and the House 414-1, with Representa-
tive Ron Paul as the only dissenter. Jessica L. Roberts, The Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act as an Antidiscrimination Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
597, 599 n.2 (2011) [hereinafter Roberts, Genetic Information]. 
 55. GINA is codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C. 
 56. Slaughter, supra note 24, at 729 (“[W]hat good is ensuring that insurers 
cannot discriminate if people can lose their jobs, and consequently their insur-
ance coverage, because of the results of genetic testing?”). 
 57. 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012). 
 58. EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS REGARDING THE GENETIC INFORMATION NONDISCRIMINATION ACT 
(2010), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/ 
resource-center/faqs/gina.pdf. 
 59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1 (2012). 
 60. Id. § 2000ff-6(a); see Purdue, supra note 11, at 1073. 
 61. § 2000ff(4)(A). 
 62. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text. 
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to conditions the employee might not actually have and might 
never even develop.63 GINA closed a more specific gap in the 
ADA as well. The ADA allows employers to request medical ex-
aminations after a job offer has been made as a condition to 
starting work, and it allows the examinations to gather infor-
mation not related to the job.64 This provision is why the plain-
tiffs in Norman-Bloodsaw lost their ADA claims, which would 
have likely been successful today under GINA.65 
4. GINA’s Uniqueness as an Antidiscrimination Law 
GINA is unique from other antidiscrimination laws in two 
important ways. First, GINA uses a privacy approach by prohib-
iting even acquiring the protected information. In other words, 
an employer could violate GINA simply by asking for the results 
of a genetic test, even if it never acted on that information.66 In 
contrast, Title VII prohibits adverse employment actions based 
on a protected category.67 Being a woman, for example, is typi-
cally not information an employer could avoid knowing about an 
employee who identifies as female. It is only when the employer 
takes some adverse action because of that characteristic that it 
has violated Title VII.68 Under GINA, the employer’s inquiry into 
whether the female employee has a gene predisposing her to 
breast cancer is enough for liability.69 This example shows why 
privacy protections can be instrumental to preventing discrimi-
nation: employers cannot discriminate if they do not possess this 
information.70 
Second, GINA is a forward-looking antidiscrimination law 
that aims to prevent future violations, unlike Title VII, for ex-
ample, which meant to curtail already-pervasive discriminatory 
practices.71 While not approaching the vast scale of discrimina-
 
 63. See Varner, supra note 46, at 205. 
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3). 
 65. See Pendo, supra note 28, at 248. 
 66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b); see Roberts, Protecting Privacy, supra note 18, 
at 2130, 2136. 
 67. § 2000e-2(a). 
 68. Roberts, Protecting Privacy, supra note 18, at 2130. 
 69. The statute makes an exception for employers who “inadvertently” ac-
quire this information. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b)(1). 
 70. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 71. See Roberts, Preempting Discrimination, supra note 42, at 440–41 (dis-
cussing the “preemptive” nature of GINA and the implications of this aspect of 
the law). 
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tion against African Americans and women in the mid-20th cen-
tury, there is evidence that genetic discrimination was a real 
problem that could only grow worse because of advancing and 
cheaper technology. Leading up to GINA’s passage, Louise 
Slaughter, the long-serving congresswoman and former microbi-
ologist who sponsored the bill, highlighted specific stories of ge-
netic discrimination against employees that came out in congres-
sional testimony.72 To prove that it was a widespread issue, 
Slaughter also pointed to the growing prevalence of advertise-
ments for genetic testing, an organization devoted to testing 
young Hasidic Jews, and statistics on employers’ use of genetic 
information about their employees.73 In a 2001 survey, about one 
percent of companies tested employees for sickle cell anemia and 
used those results in hiring, firing, and promotion decisions.74 A 
fifth of companies inquired about family medical history and 
about a quarter of those relied on that information in taking em-
ployment actions.75 In addition, a survey of Massachusetts resi-
dents in 2000 found almost 600 people who said they “had been 
turned down for jobs because of ‘flaws’ discovered in their genes,” 
and a 1996 survey found that thirteen percent of Americans re-
ported they or a family member had lost their jobs because of 
genetic conditions such as risk of heart disease or mental prob-
lems.76 
However, prior to GINA’s passage, some members of Con-
gress called the bill “a solution in search of a problem.”77 These 
skeptics might be justified based on the number of GINA claims 
filed with the EEOC since the statute went into effect. From 
2010 to 2016, the EEOC received around 200 or 300 charges a 
year under GINA, and typically at least half result in a finding 
of “no reasonable cause.”78 By comparison, in 2016 there were 
over 32,000 race-based charges79 and almost 27,000 sex-based 
 
 72. For example, a high-performing social worker was fired when her em-
ployer discovered her family’s history of Huntington’s disease. Slaughter, supra 
note 24, at 725–26. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic Data and Civil Rights, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 75, 87 (2016) [hereinafter Ajunwa, Genetic Data]. 
 77. Slaughter, supra note 24, at 725. 
 78. Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act Charges, EEOC, https:// 
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/genetic.cfm (last visited Nov. 2, 
2018). 
 79. Race-Based Charges, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/ 
enforcement/race.cfm (last visited Nov. 2, 2018). 
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charges.80 The EEOC did not even file its first lawsuit under 
GINA until 2013.81 Of course, it is virtually impossible to know 
whether the low number of GINA claims is because there is low 
public awareness of the law,82 the law is successfully preventing 
genetic discrimination, or there are simply few incidents of this 
problem in the first place. 
Nevertheless, some scholars argue that there is substantial 
anecdotal evidence of genetic discrimination, enough to render it 
a problem that needs addressing.83 According to the EEOC, a 
complainant often does not allege a GINA violation until “after 
the investigation of an ADA charge uncovered evidence that an 
employer had asked about an employee’s family [medical] his-
tory.”84 Given that GINA is a relatively new law and employment 
practices and technology are constantly evolving, its impact is 
difficult to evaluate. Looking at the number of EEOC claims by 
themselves, it is clear that the risks of genetic discrimination are 
real and can negatively impact individuals.85 Just because the 
number of charges under Title VII dwarf those under GINA does 
not mean that GINA serves little purpose. By anticipating the 
greater risks that more advanced technology presents, GINA is 
just as much about prevention as it is about providing remedies 
for statutory violations.86 After all, genetic testing is still becom-
ing much cheaper and more accessible.87 Because prevention is 
 
 80. Sex-Based Charges, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/ 
enforcement/sex.cfm (last visited Nov. 2, 2018). 
 81. See Press Release, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Fabricut to Pay 
$50,000 to Settle EEOC Disability and Genetic Information Discrimination 
Lawsuit, (May 7, 2013), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/5-7-13b 
.cfm. 
 82. Alicia A. Parkman et al., Public Awareness of Genetic Nondiscrimina-
tion Laws in Four States and Perceived Importance of Life Insurance Protec-
tions, 24 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 512, 515 (stating that less than twenty per-
cent of adult survey respondents are even aware there are genetic 
nondiscrimination laws). 
 83. See Pendo, supra note 28, at 246. 
 84. Robert C. Green et al., GINA, Genetic Discrimination, and Genomic 
Medicine, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 397, 398 (2015). 
 85. When it is a company-wide employment policy, such practices can affect 
many people. In Norman-Bloodsaw, for example, “the class of employees and 
job applicants affected by the settlement . . . ‘stretched back 27 years to 1972 
and involve[d] as many as 8,000 people.’” Pendo, supra note 28, at 247. 
 86. Cf. id. at 247 (“It is fair to say that the risk of genetic discrimination 
increases as genetic tests become more available, and genetic information is 
more commonly included in medical records.”). 
 87. See LEFEBVRE, supra note 36, at 7, 8. 
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difficult if not impossible to quantify, measuring GINA’s impact 
is that much harder. 
B. WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS 
Contemporary workplace wellness programs are only the 
latest instance of employers collecting medical information from 
employees. After World War II, companies required widespread 
medical testing for both diagnostic and predictive purposes, un-
derstanding that it was in their financial interest to have 
healthy employees.88 By the 1980s, almost all employers with 
over 500 employees required pre-employment medical tests.89 At 
the same time, healthcare costs began rising substantially, so 
these exams’ role shifted to screening out potential employees 
who would increase a company’s health insurance costs.90 While 
today the ADA, HIPAA, and GINA provide significant protection 
against this intrusive practice, the same kind of testing and in-
quiry remains in wellness programs. 
By now, these programs are ubiquitous and take almost in-
finite forms. Generally, they reward employees for working to-
ward certain health goals or engaging in healthy activities. Alt-
hough there is no single definition of such programs, they all aim 
to further employers’ shared goals: to lower health insurance 
costs and have healthier, more productive employees.91 It is easy 
to understand why wellness programs are so attractive to em-
ployers. Around two-thirds of American adults are overweight or 
obese92 and chronic conditions that cause seventy percent of 
adult deaths—such as hypertension and diabetes—are both 
costly and usually preventable.93 Not only does chronic disease 
increase the costs of health insurance for employers, but it also 
 
 88. Mark A. Rothstein, The Law of Medical and Genetic Privacy in the 
Workplace, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
IN THE GENETIC ERA, supra note 25, at 281–82. 
 89. Id. at 282. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Bahaudin G. Mujtaba & Frank J. Cavico, Corporate Wellness Programs: 
Implementation Challenges in the Modern American Workplace, 1 INT’L J. 
HEALTH POL’Y & MGMT. 193, 194 (2013). 
 92. Steven C. Sizemore, Comment, A Fatter Butt Equals a Skinnier Wallet: 
Why Workplace Wellness Programs Discriminate Against the Obese and Violate 
Federal Employment Law, 11 WYO. L. REV. 639, 642 (2011). 
 93. Adrianna McIntyre et al., The Dubious Empirical and Legal Founda-
tions of Workplace Wellness Programs, 27 HEALTH MATRIX: J. L.-MED. 59, 61 
(2017). 
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reduces productivity due to employees missing work and work-
ing while sick.94 
Workplace wellness programs come in a variety of forms, 
and they can be mandatory or voluntary. Penalties under man-
datory programs to ensure compliance can be severe: “increasing 
employee health-related contributions, garnishing wages, and 
even restricting employee access to the workplace itself.”95 Many 
employers also include spouses, children, and even retirees in 
their programs.96 Initial screening activities are the most com-
mon feature and serve as an entry point for further interven-
tions.97 This screening often consists of a detailed questionnaire 
called a Health Risk Assessment (HRA) and then might be fol-
lowed by biometric testing, which may involve obtaining employ-
ees’ medical histories, taking blood tests for cholesterol, and re-
cording employees’ heights and weights.98 This baseline 
information can then be used both to incentivize employees to 
maintain healthy habits and measure their progress in improv-
ing certain health markers and also to penalize employees for 
failing to meet certain health standards.99 These incentives and 
penalties often take the forms of reimbursement for health care 
spending and reductions or increases in health insurance premi-
ums.100 As technology has evolved, constant fitness monitoring 
of employees has become increasingly common.101 A market re-
 
 94. Id. at 62. 
 95. Daniel Charles Rubenstein, Comment, The Emergence of Mandatory 
Wellness Programs in the United States: Welcoming, or Worrisome?, 12 J. 
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 99, 101 (2009). Some scholars have also argued that 
today’s wellness programs are both “more intensive and coercive than earlier 
models.” Gordon Hull & Frank Pasquale, Toward a Critical Theory of Corporate 
Wellness, 13 BIOSOCIETIES 190, 200 (2018). 
 96. Employer Wellness Programs: Better Health Outcomes and Lower Costs: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 114th Cong. 
23 (2015) (statement of Catherine Baase, Chief Medical Officer, The Dow Chem-
ical Company) [hereinafter Employer Wellness Programs: Better Health Out-
comes and Lower Costs]. 
 97. McIntyre et al., supra note 93, at 60. 
 98. Mujtaba & Cavico, supra note 91, at 193–94; Sizemore, supra note 92, 
at 646. 
 99. For a comprehensive discussion of incentives and penalties, see Mu-
jtaba & Cavico, supra note 91, at 194–96. 
 100. See, e.g., Ifeoma Ajunwa et al., Health and Big Data: An Ethical Frame-
work for Health Information Collection by Corporate Wellness Programs, 44 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 474, 476 (2016). 
 101. See id. at 478; Corporate Wellness Is a 13 Million Unit Wearable Wire-
less Device Opportunity, ABI RES. (Sept. 25, 2013), https://www.abiresearch 
.com/press/corporate-wellness-is-a-13-million-unit-wearable-w [hereinafter 
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search firm estimates that by 2018 over 13 million wearable fit-
ness tracking devices will be integrated into workplace wellness 
programs.102 Programs also encourage preventative measures 
such as gym membership discounts, immunizations, and healthy 
cafeteria food.103 They may involve an educational component 
that can include nutrition counseling, stress management pro-
grams, or medical education through classes and online re-
sources.104 
Workplace wellness programs are, by now, ubiquitous. Be-
tween one-half and two-thirds of employers, and virtually all em-
ployers with more than 200 employees, have some kind of pro-
gram.105 Wellness programs have flourished under the ACA, 
which aimed to reduce the nation’s health care spending in ad-
dition to insuring more people.106 The ACA encouraged employ-
ers to implement wellness programs to bring down health care 
costs. Workplace wellness programs garnered such broad sup-
port that this part of the law is considered one of the only ACA 
provisions with bipartisan support.107 The workplace wellness 
industry is also big business. Over half of large employers offer 
incentive-based programs, usually managed by third-party ven-
dors, “which increasingly include health-contingent programs 
that reward employees for remedying identified risks.”108 It is 
estimated that by 2020 corporate wellness vendors will be a $12 
billion industry.109 
 
Corporate Wellness]. 
 102. Corporate Wellness, supra note 101.  
 103. Employer Wellness Programs: Better Health Outcomes and Lower Costs, 
supra note 96. 
 104. Mujtaba & Cavico, supra note 91. 
 105. Ajunwa et al., supra note 100. 
 106. See Dennis G. Shea & Dennis Scanlon, Moving Beyond “Wellness Does 
Not Work,” 27 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L.-MED. 125, 128 (2017). 
 107. See Belluz, supra note 4. 
 108.  Jill R. Horwitz et al., Wellness Incentives in the Workplace: Cost Sav-
ings Through Cost Shifting to Unhealthy Workers, 32 HEALTH AFF. 468, 469 
(2013); see also Julie Appleby, New Wellness Program Rules Elicit Mixed Reac-
tions, GOVERNING (May 18, 2016), http://www.governing.com/topics/health 
-human-services/khn-eeoc-wellness-rules.html. 
 109. Jay Hancock, Workplace Wellness Programs Put Employee Privacy at 
Risk, CNN (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/28/health/workplace 
-wellness-privacy-risk-exclusive/index.html. 
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C. REGULATING WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS 
1. Statutes and Agency Rules 
Workplace wellness programs have long been subject to fed-
eral regulation. These statutes and regulations are concerned 
with the inherently discriminatory nature of health-contingent 
wellness programs, which by definition treat employees differ-
ently based on health status.110 Originally, this kind of discrim-
ination would have violated HIPAA, so Congress created “an ex-
ception that allowed employers to condition up to twenty percent 
of the cost of coverage upon successfully meeting wellness stand-
ards.”111 Provisions addressing wellness programs were also 
added in ERISA, the Internal Revenue Code, and the Public 
Health Service Act—laws that prohibited insurers from discrim-
inating based on health in eligibility, benefits or premiums.112 
The ADA also addresses workplace wellness programs out of con-
cern for privacy and implications for people with disabilities. The 
ADA’s more significant limitations include strict confidentiality 
requirements for health-related information and “requiring al-
ternatives for individuals who are able to perform the essential 
functions of their job but, because of disability, unable to achieve 
a health factor requirement under a mandatory wellness 
plan.”113 
The ACA encouraged participation in wellness programs 
mostly by increasing the amount employees could be reim-
bursed. The law allows employer-sponsored health plans to in-
clude wellness programs that are voluntary and “reasonably de-
signed,”114 and it raised the incentive limit to a thirty percent 
reduction in coverage costs and fifty percent for smokers.115 The 
ACA allows for considerable discretion in how employers craft 
their wellness programs. A “reasonably designed” program does 
not have to be based on empirical evidence or collect information 
on the impacts of the program on employees’ health.116 The ACA 
 
 110. McIntyre et al., supra note 93, at 64. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Employer Wellness Programs: Better Health Outcomes and Lower Costs, 
supra note 96, at 24. 
 113. Kristin N. Stone, Emerging Voices: Limitations & Legal Implications of 
Employee Wellness Programs, 63 LAB. L.J., 72, 74 (2012). 
 114. Kathy L. Hudson & Karen Pollitz, Undermining Genetic Privacy? Em-
ployee Wellness Programs and the Law, 37 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 1 (2017). 
 115. Kristin Madison et al., Smoking, Obesity, Health Insurance, and Health 
Incentives in the Affordable Care Act, 310 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 143, 143 (2013). 
 116. Hudson & Pollitz, supra note 114, at 1–2. 
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also incorporated wellness program incentives into Medicaid and 
Medicare.117 
Finally, GINA contains an exception for workplace wellness 
programs. It allows employers to obtain genetic data and family 
medical history about employees and their family members vol-
untarily as part of these programs.118 The EEOC’s first rulemak-
ing concerning GINA and wellness programs in 2010—pre-
ACA—explicitly barred employers from offering any incentives 
for employees to provide genetic information as part of a well-
ness program.119 This regulation was significant, given that over 
three quarters of companies included questions about family 
medical history in their HRAs “or use[d] such histories to link an 
employee’s participation in these types of risk assessments to 
wellness rewards or penalties.”120 A case from 2014—before the 
EEOC proposed new rules on this issue—illustrates the tension 
between the ACA’s encouragement of wellness programs and 
GINA’s antidiscrimination and privacy protections. To partici-
pate in one of its health insurance programs, Honeywell required 
employees to undergo tests and provide medical information 
about a spouse, otherwise employees would be subject to finan-
cial surcharges and would not be eligible for a Health Savings 
Account.121 The EEOC sued, claiming the incentives “made par-
ticipation non-voluntary under the ADA and GINA even if the 
incentives complied with the ACA and its implementing regula-
tions.”122 A federal judge denied the agency’s motion for a pre-
liminary injunction in part because of confusion around this area 
of law.123 
In May 2016, the EEOC issued a final rule that clarified the 
statute’s exception and moved away from its original position 
 
 117. Madison et al., supra note 115. 
 118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-2(b)(2)(B) (2012) (stating that the employee must 
give “prior, knowing, voluntary, and written authorization”). 
 119. 75 Fed. Reg. 68,912, 68,935 (Nov. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. 
pt. 1635). 
 120. Bard, supra note 13, at 480. 
 121. EEOC v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. 14-4517 ADM/TNL, 2014 WL 
5795481, at *1–2 (D. Minn. Nov. 6, 2014). 
 122. Paul H. Kehoe, A Proposed Fix for Wellness Plans, SEYFARTH SHAW 
LLP: EMP. L. LOOKOUT (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.laborandemploymentlaw 
counsel.com/2015/03/a-proposed-fix-for-wellness-plans. 
 123. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 2014 WL 5795481, at *5–6 (noting the “great un-
certainty” in how GINA interacts with the ACA and that Honeywell’s program 
appears to comply with the ACA, but more clarity is needed). For a detailed 
review of wellness program case law, see Elizabeth A. Brown, Workplace Well-
ness: Social Injustice, 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 191, 231–40 (2017). 
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that no incentives were acceptable. With this post-ACA rulemak-
ing, the EEOC had wanted to “harmonize” GINA and the ADA 
with the antidiscrimination protections of HIPAA and the well-
ness programs provisions of the ACA.124 The rule specified what 
level of inducement qualifies as “voluntary” and when it ap-
plies.125 It allowed employers to offer an inducement to an em-
ployee for their spouse to share genetic information and undergo 
testing as part of the wellness program.126 The inducement can-
not exceed thirty percent of the employee’s cost for self-only 
health insurance coverage under the employer’s group health 
plan.127 Incentivizing the acquisition of the employee’s children’s 
genetic data was still prohibited because it is possible to learn 
genetic information about an employee from the genetics of their 
children but not their spouse.128 
Although the EEOC attempted to reconcile GINA and the 
ADA with workplace wellness programs in this recent rulemak-
ing, swift litigation has revealed the conflict between these laws 
and programs in terms of incentives. Arguing that the rules neg-
atively affect its members, the AARP prevailed on its summary 
judgment motion in August 2017, when a federal district judge 
in Washington D.C. found that the rules should not receive Chev-
ron deference because the EEOC failed to provide a reasoned ex-
planation for the thirty percent incentive level.129 However, the 
judge left the rule in place and remanded to the agency for re-
consideration rather than vacating the rule, which would be too 
disruptive to employers already relying on it.130 Then in Decem-
ber 2017, on the AARP’s motion to amend the judgment, the 
judge overruled his earlier opinion because leaving the “arbi-
trary and capricious” rules in place until the agency issues new 
 
 124. See, e.g., AARP v. EEOC, 267 F. Supp. 3d 14, 29 (D.D.C. 2017) (“[The 
EEOC] argues principally that it adopted this new interpretation to harmonize 
its regulations with the HIPAA regulations governing wellness programs and 
to induce more individuals to participate in wellness programs, as that was the 
goal expressed by Congress in the ACA.”). 
 125. EEOC’s Final Rule on Employer Wellness Programs and the Genetic In-
formation Nondiscrimination Act, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/ 
regulations/qanda-gina-wellness-final-rule.cfm (last visited Nov. 2, 2018) [here-
inafter EEOC’s Final Rule]. 
 126. Id. 
 127. 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8(b)(2)(iii) (2017). 
 128. EEOC’s Final Rule, supra note 125. 
 129. AARP, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 37. For a detailed explanation of how the 
EEOC appears to have settled on the thirty percent level, see Brown, supra note 
123, at 230–31. 
 130. AARP, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 38. 
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final rules—three years later, at the earliest—would be “unac-
ceptable.”131 Still concerned with immediate disruptive conse-
quences of vacating the rules on wellness program policies, he 
instead ordered a vacatur to take effect on January 1, 2019, leav-
ing in place 2018 plans.132 
2. Proposed Legislation 
This regulation was not expansive enough for some policy-
makers. House Republicans have recently proposed a bill, the 
“Preserving Employee Wellness Programs Act” (PEWPA) that 
would override any agency rules.133 Supported by the American 
Benefits Council, a lobbying organization that represents em-
ployers, the bill was voted out of committee on party lines in 
March 2017.134 The sponsors did not think the EEOC rules went 
far enough and would actually discourage employers’ wellness 
programs by setting incentives too low to influence employees’ 
behavior.135 PEWPA would allow employers to offer greater in-
centives—up to thirty percent of the cost of coverage of an entire 
family, rather than the cost of covering only the employee—with-
out running afoul of GINA and the ADA.136 It would tie this in-
centive to the ACA’s allowance of reducing health insurance up 
 
 131. AARP v. EEOC, 292 F. Supp. 3d 238, 245 (D.D.C. 2017) (“If left to its 
own devices, then, EEOC will not have a new rule ready to take effect for over 
three years—not what the Court envisioned when it assumed that the Commis-
sion could address its errors ‘in a timely manner.’”). 
 132. Id. at 241. 
 133. H.R. 1313, 115th Cong. (2017).  
 134. Editorial, A House Bill Poses a Threat to Worker Privacy, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-house-bill-poses-a 
-threat-to-worker-privacy/2017/03/31/654ca80a-0f53-11e7-9d5a-a83e627dc120_ 
story.html; Lena H. Sun, Employees Who Decline Genetic Testing Could Face 
Penalties Under Proposed Bill, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2017), https://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2017/03/11/employees-who-decline 
-genetic-testing-could-face-penalities-under-proposed-bill. 
 135. See Harold Bishop, Notes on: Are Employer Wellness Programs Under 
Attack by the EEOC?, 67 LAB. L.J. 556, 559 (2016); see also Gary Loveman, BRT 
Comment Letter to EEOC on Wellness Programs, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (June 19, 
2015), http://businessroundtable.org/resources/brt-comment-letter-eeoc 
-wellness-programs. The sponsor of the bill argued that employers faced contra-
dictory regulations as if confronted with conflicting road signs: “Although both 
turns seem permitted, no matter which decision drivers make, they could still 
be punished.” Virginia Foxx, Preserving Employee Wellness Programs, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/apr/18/ 
employee-wellness-programs-should-be-preserved. 
 136. Reed Abelson, How Healthy Are You? G.O.P. Bill Would Help Employ-
ers Find Out, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/10/ 
health/workplace-wellness-programs-health-genetic-data.html. 
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to thirty percent to generally incentivize wellness program par-
ticipation rather than have specific rules for when employers 
seek genetic information.137 In other words, under PEWPA, if a 
program complies with ACA standards, then it would also com-
ply with GINA and the ADA.138 
The bill has been met with substantial criticism. Over sev-
enty groups including the AARP and American Academy of Pe-
diatrics signed a letter to the House committee arguing that the 
bill would weaken GINA’s and the ADA’s privacy protections.139 
The American Society of Human Genetics has publicly opposed 
the bill, claiming it would coerce employees to give up private 
information.140 Some scholars contend that the bill fundamen-
tally misunderstands the relationship between these laws and 
that they actually do not conflict at all.141 The controversy over 
this bill is emblematic of how the important privacy concerns of 
GINA interact with wellness programs’ complex statutory and 
regulatory framework. The next Part explains why these criti-
cisms about genetic privacy and lack of voluntariness have merit 
with regard to any financial incentive at all. 
II.  PRIVACY AND COERCION WHERE GINA AND 
WELLNESS PROGRAM INCENTIVES MEET   
As Part I described, there is obvious tension between GINA 
and wellness programs wherever there is disclosure of statuto-
rily protected genetic information. Because this information is 
often central to programs’ assessments of employees’ health, all 
parties involved have a great interest in the regulation of this 
practice.142 Attempts to define an incentive that maintains a pro-
gram’s voluntary nature confront a complicated statutory and 
regulatory landscape as well as competing interests, with corpo-
rations on one side and consumer advocates on the other. This 
 
 137. Hudson & Pollitz, supra note 114, at 2–3. 
 138. Id. at 3. 
 139. Sun, supra note 134. 
 140. ASHG Opposes H.R. 1313, the Preserving Employee Wellness Programs 
Act, AM. SOC’Y HUM. GENETICS (Mar. 8, 2017), http://www.ashg.org/press/ 
201703-HR1313.html. 
 141. See Hudson & Pollitz, supra note 114, at 2–3 (2017); see also Editorial, 
supra note 134 (“According to advocates, the bill was never meant to threaten 
employees’ privacy, yet by painting their act in sloppy strokes, that is what its 
authors have done.”). 
 142. See Bard, supra note 13, at 482 (“Disclosing family health history, how-
ever, is at the core of most Wellness Programs because it is the starting point of 
assessing what particular risks an individual employee faces.”). 
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Part argues that any financial incentive at all for disclosing per-
sonal genetic information renders a wellness program involun-
tary and thus in violation of GINA. As Samuel R. Bagenstos 
writes, “as a matter of privacy and social equality, employers 
should not be permitted to leverage their economic power over 
employees as a means of controlling the aspects of workers’ out-
of-work lives that wellness programs affect.”143 Applied in this 
context, such leverage amounts to coercion and strikes at the 
ideals envisaged for GINA when Congress passed this law. This 
Part describes the problems this practice presents, beginning 
with an examination of how the law treats the idea of coercion 
and, applied to this specific wellness program context, how such 
a legal framework suggests that financial incentives for provid-
ing genetic information is unacceptably coercive. To illustrate 
why this practice in particular is coercive, this Part contrasts it 
with the related but distinguishable example of incentives for 
participating in scientific research. Next, this Part explains the 
practical economic impact of this incentive scheme on lower-in-
come workers, for whom any discount on premiums may be dif-
ficult to turn down. Finally, this Part shows how both the pub-
lic’s poor understanding of genetic science and the data privacy 
concerns involved in the information gathered by wellness pro-
grams exacerbate the coercion problem and create greater risks 
of genetic discrimination. 
A. VOLUNTARINESS, COERCION, AND FINANCIAL INCENTIVES 
FOR GENETIC INFORMATION 
Interpreting “voluntary” to allow financial incentives for 
any amount or kind of genetic information would render them 
impermissibly coercive. The idea of voluntariness and coercion 
are ill-defined concepts in the law because they are heavily con-
text-dependent.144 Bagenstos advocates a standard for this vol-
untariness requirement that would prohibit employers from of-
fering incentives that give an employee “no fair choice” in 
participating.145 Similarly, the philosopher John Hodson pro-
poses that the unifying principle for legal coercion involves the 
 
 143. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The EEOC, the ADA, and Workplace Wellness 
Programs, 27 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L.-MED. 81, 82 (2017). 
 144. See, e.g., id. at 87. 
 145. See id. at 91. For in-depth arguments in favor of no financial incentives 
for information protected under the ADA specifically—not GINA—see generally 
id.; Stefanie Brody, Working Well(ness): The Impact of the ADA Final Rule on 
Wellness Program Regulation and a Proposal for a Zero-Incentive Rule, 11 ST. 
LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 209 (2017). 
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recognition “of each person’s having control over his or her own 
life in accordance with his or her own unencumbered choices.”146 
While it is widely accepted that some level of coercion is neces-
sary for a functioning democratic society,147 the law has also 
found certain policies to be unacceptably coercive.148 Kristin M. 
Madison et al. cite an inclusive definition: “the intentional use of 
a credible and severe threat of harm or force to control another 
or to compel him or her to do something.”149 David A. Reidy and 
Walter J. Riker point out common examples of legal coercion as 
“clubs and other voluntary organizations . . . coerc[ing] members 
to insure [sic] fidelity to organizational norms and ends,” and 
“officials sanction[ing] and sometimes dissolv[ing] corpora-
tions.”150 More broadly, the law itself is coercive in that it seeks 
to shape people’s behavior according to the legislature’s com-
mands.151 The theory of “universal coercionism” even asserts 
that “every exchange, even in a competitive market, is co-
erced.”152 In her discussion of the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions,153 Kathleen Sullivan advocates for a broad view of 
coercion that can exist “even in the absence of force or fraud, and 
even in an apparently consensual bargain.”154 
 
 146. JOHN D. HODSON, THE ETHICS OF LEGAL COERCION 129 (1983). 
 147. DAVID A. REIDY & WALTER J. RIKER, COERCION AND THE STATE 1, 2 (Da-
vid A. Reidy & Walter J. Riker eds., 2008) (“Coercion is . . . “an ubiquitous fea-
ture of our institutional, political world.”); Coercion, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA 
PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/coercion (last updated Oct. 27, 2011) 
(“A state’s legitimacy and sovereignty is sometimes thought to depend on its 
ability to use coercion effectively and to monopolize its use within its territory 
against competitors, both internal and external.”). 
 148. Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, which concerns whether the federal 
government has coerced states into taking a certain action, is a paradigmatic 
example. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 583 
(2012) (striking down the ACA’s Medicaid expansion provision on the ground 
that it was unconstitutionally coercive). 
 149. Kristin M. Madison et al., The Law, Policy, and Ethics of Employers’ 
Use of Financial Incentives to Improve Health, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 450, 459 
(2011). 
 150.  REIDY & RIKER, supra note 147. 
 151. See id. 
 152. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 
1413, 1446–47 (1989) (citing the work of Robert Hale). 
 153. See id. at 1425 (“An unconstitutional conditions challenge asks whether 
government’s offer of a benefit on condition demands stronger justification than 
the minimally rational basis that would support the government’s uncondi-
tional offer or wholesale denial of the same benefit.”). 
 154. Id. at 1420. 
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While it can be difficult to define when a law is too coercive, 
weighing considerations such as utility can be useful. For exam-
ple, coercion “does not always deliver, indeed, does not always 
promise, significant utility gains,” and it “sometimes so offends 
against freedom, equality, independence, respect or some other 
value affirmed by those acting within the relevant institutional 
or political context that it cannot be morally redeemed by utility 
gains, even if they are significant gains.”155 Sullivan describes 
coercion as “depend[ing] on underlying theories of autonomy, 
utility, fairness, or desert.”156 
Under this pseudo-balancing framework, genetic infor-
mation’s minimal utility does not outweigh privacy concerns, 
thus rendering this “apparently consensual” practice impermis-
sibly coercive. One justification for violating the principle of un-
encumbered choice is what Hodson calls “the welfare principle,” 
which “require[s] persons to aid others, provided that what is re-
quired is (or is quite likely to be) vital to the personal function-
ing . . . of those aided.”157 This idea highlights why financial in-
centives in this context are coercive: there is no clear benefit to 
employees—or even to employers—of disclosing this information 
as part of a wellness program. While it is true employees would 
save some money on their health insurance, they would do so 
after facing an unfair choice. Moreover, the fact that genetics is 
such a unique concept burdened with risks and nonmonetary 
value further distorts the equation.158 These significant but in-
tangible harms related to privacy and DNA’s role in conceptions 
of identity make these incentives too coercive because these pol-
icies “involve a departure from some baseline of ‘the normal or 
natural or expected course of events’ that makes the recipient 
worse off.”159 
It is worth noting that the way one views an incentive—as 
financial rewards or penalties—does not have bearing on 
whether it could be considered coercive or not. Because coercion 
is an “inescapably normative” concept,160 it is tempting to con-
sider such a policy differently depending on how it is framed. For 
example, people overwhelmingly support the idea of discounts 
 
 155. REIDY & RIKER, supra note 147. 
 156. Sullivan, supra note 152, at 1443. 
 157. HODSON, supra note 146, at 130 (emphasis added). 
 158. See infra Part III.A.1 (describing the significance of genetics to one’s 
identity and how privacy relates to genetics). 
 159. Sullivan, supra note 152, at 1448 n.142. 
 160. Id. at 1446, 1450. 
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on health insurance for participation in a weight management 
program—a reward—but overwhelmingly disapprove of man-
dating a higher premium for those who do not participate in such 
a program.161 The reality is that these designs can very well be 
identical; how employees view it depends on the employer’s 
presentation.162 For lower-income employees “for whom ‘the only 
way to obtain affordable insurance is to meet the targets,’ incen-
tive programs’ voluntariness can become dubious and ‘programs 
that are offered as carrots may feel more like sticks,’”163 or, as 
one scholar calls it, a “privacy tax.”164 The EEOC enforcement 
guidance regarding the ADA and disability-related inquiries 
from 2000 stated, “A wellness program is ‘voluntary’ as long as 
an employer neither requires participation nor penalizes em-
ployees who do not participate.”165 Since an incentive could just 
as well be a penalty depending on one’s perspective, framing the 
incentive as a reward does not mean that it is not coercive.166 
Even the pro-incentives business interests and politicians 
who support PEWPA do not articulate a reason for why a well-
ness program should be free to collect the family medical history 
of employees and their family members.167 The common assump-
tion is that this information is useful in evaluating future health 
 
 161. Madison et al., supra note 149, at 458. 
 162. See id. at 459 (“[I]t is not clear that all carrots are created equally, as 
they can often be reframed easily as sticks.”). 
 163. Id. (quoting Harald Schmidt et al., Carrots, Sticks and Health Care Re-
form—Problems with Wellness Incentives, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. e3(1), e3(3) 
(2010)); see also Bagenstos, supra note 143, at 88–90. 
 164. Robert Sprague, Survey of (Mostly Outdated and Often Ineffective) Laws 
Affecting Work-Related Monitoring, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 221, 250 (2018) (citing 
Mark A. Rothstein & Heather L. Harrell, Health Risk Reduction Programs in 
Employer-Sponsored Health Plans: Part I—Efficacy, 51 J. OCCUPATIONAL & EN-
VTL. MED. 943, 944 (2009)). 
 165. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, No. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT 
GUIDANCE: DISABILITY-RELATED INQUIRIES AND MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS OF 
EMPLOYEES UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA) (2000), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html. 
 166. See Madison et al., supra note 149, at 460; see also Sullivan, supra note 
152, at 1436, 1440 (explaining how the baseline from which the Supreme Court 
views a law influences whether the Court upholds it). 
 167. Rather, their advocating of enshrining incentives in the law is usually 
articulated as a reining in of the EEOC’s wellness program litigation and exces-
sive government regulation that is burdensome to employers. See, e.g., COMM. 
ON EDUC. & THE WORKFORCE, FACT SHEET: PRESERVING EMPLOYEE WELLNESS 
PROGRAMS ACT (2017), https://edworkforce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/preserving_ 
employee_wellness_programs_act.pdf; Sun, supra note 134; see also Foxx, supra 
note 135. 
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risks and taking steps to prevent illness.168 One wellness pro-
gram vendor executive even complained that GINA’s ban on col-
lecting this information would “hamstring companies’ ability to 
collect more extensive information to help design wellness pro-
grams.”169 However, research has not found that this infor-
mation actually promotes better health among employees.170 In 
fact, this specific practice fits into the larger picture of wellness 
programs’ ineffectiveness overall at improving workers’ health 
and lowering health care costs.171 As one writer put it, “the an-
swer is always to eat better and exercise more regardless of your 
genes,”172 so incentivizing GINA-protected information is just 
not useful enough to justify the invasion of privacy. 
1. Distinguishing Between an Example of Legal Coercion: 
Human Subject Research 
A closely related but distinguishable example of legal coer-
cion is financially incentivizing human subject research in the 
sciences. Bioethicist Ezekiel J. Emanuel has argued that induc-
ing participation in clinical trials, even with high monetary re-
wards, is ethical because the institutional review boards (IRBs) 
that evaluate research proposals only approve trials that will not 
 
 168. See Bard, supra note 13, at 480. 
 169. See id. 
 170. See id. at 481 (quoting the president of the American Heart Association, 
who pointed out the absence of data “suggest[ing] that knowing family history 
per se affects the success of a wellness program”).  
 171. See, e.g., Brody, supra note 145, at 214; Horwitz et al., supra note 108, 
at 469 (explaining that any cost savings an employer experiences “may come 
from making workers with health risks pay more for their health care than 
workers without health risks do”); Jessica L. Roberts & Leah R. Fowler, How 
Assuming Autonomy May Undermine Wellness Programs, 27 HEALTH MATRIX: 
J. L.-MED. 101, 111–12 (2017) (citing a study of ten years’ worth of data finding 
that the return on investment was only fifty cents for every dollar spent on the 
wellness program). Nearly all of the studies highlighting wellness program suc-
cess stories have been conducted by wellness vendors themselves using non-
rigorous, flawed methods. See, e.g., Michael Hiltzik, A Federal Judge Takes Aim 
at ‘Voluntary’ Company Wellness Programs that Invade Your Privacy, L.A. 
TIMES (Dec. 27, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik 
-wellness-20171227-story.html; Al Lewis, Genetic Testing: The New Frontier of 
Wellness Madness, HEALTH CARE BLOG (Dec. 16, 2015), http://thehealthcare 
blog.com/blog/2015/12/16/genetic-testing-the-new-frontier-of-wellness 
-madness/. 
 172. Al Lewis, Your Employer’s Wellness Program Can Demand Your DNA, 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 14, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/al-lewis/ 
should-your-employers-wellness-program-can-demand-your-dna_b_7249684 
.html. 
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be excessively risky or painful.173 Thus, even if participants en-
roll in a study out of poor judgment and a high incentive, they 
will not become worse off because of the safeguards of the IRB 
process.174 A critique of Emanuel’s view is that it focuses too 
much on the risk of such participation and not enough on the 
context of the offer, namely that there are special concerns for 
people in vulnerable populations or circumstances.175 A critical 
difference between human subject research and wellness pro-
grams is that in the latter, there is an employer-employee rela-
tionship where the employer has the upper hand and the em-
ployee depends upon continued employment and health 
insurance.176 This power imbalance “alters the options availa-
ble.”177 
The coercive nature of offering financial incentives for dis-
closing genetic information may not be immediately obvious, es-
pecially since analogizing it with voluntary human subject re-
search seems at least superficially reasonable. If one views 
coercion as a high standard requiring serious threats and signif-
icant harm,178 simply paying thirty percent more in health pre-
miums might not seem to rise to this level. Under Emanuel’s 
framework, the purported benefits of disclosing genetic infor-
mation in a wellness program—greater awareness of one’s 
health risks and better health—could make this practice ac-
ceptable.179 However, Title II of GINA is an employment antidis-
crimination law, which “put[s] all workers, when compared 
across the forbidden axes of discrimination, on the same footing 
in dealing with their employers.”180 If financial incentives give 
some—wealthier—employees a fair choice and not others, then 
GINA is not putting employees on the same footing. Moreover, 
 
 173. See generally Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Ending Concerns About Undue In-
ducement, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 100 (2004) (arguing that worries about undue 
inducement are displacements of other ethical concerns). 
 174. See id. at 104. 
 175. See generally Joan McGregor, Undue Influence as Coercive Offers in 
Clinical Trials, in COERCION AND THE STATE, supra note 147, at 45 (suggesting 
that, with sufficiently vulnerable populations, coercion may be accomplished by 
offer instead of requiring a threat). 
 176. Bagenstos, supra note 143, at 91 (“[W]orkers are, in general, asymmet-
rically vulnerable in the employment relationship . . . it is generally much easier 
for an employer to find another worker than it is for an employee to find another 
job.”). 
 177. See McGregor, supra note 175, at 50. 
 178. But see id. at 45. 
 179. See Madison et al., supra note 149, at 461. 
 180. Bagenstos, supra note 143, at 92. 
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the importance of health insurance in this scenario should not 
be overlooked. Unlike in scientific research where participation 
is not essential to the research subjects, employees in the well-
ness program context are coming from a place of needing health 
insurance. Foregoing an incentive would still be altering such a 
fundamental benefit, even if it is not entirely taken away. The 
unique and changing nature of health care costs also complicates 
this equation, as thirty percent of self-only coverage could repre-
sent a much higher dollar amount in five or ten years given how 
costs only keep increasing.181 
2. Coercion and Disparate Economic Impact on Lower-Income 
Employees 
While the Sections above outlined how the very theory of fi-
nancial incentives for providing genetic information is coercive, 
such a policy can, in practice, adversely impact vulnerable pop-
ulations. Financial incentives at any level—and particularly as 
high as thirty percent—can really function as penalties, not “in-
centives,”182 which are theoretically allowed by GINA’s exception 
for “voluntary” programs. Instead, they create inequality be-
tween poorer and wealthier people in terms of privacy rights; 
only employees with more resources have a true option of keep-
ing this personal information private if they wish, while lower-
income workers might find the incentive hard to resist. 
Statistics on average income and health insurance costs il-
lustrate just how coercive such a regulatory scheme can be. In 
2015, for example, self-only coverage cost, on average, $6,251 per 
year.183 Since forty percent of American households earn less 
than $42,000 annually, saving $1,875—thirty percent of the cov-
erage cost—in exchange for disclosing this information could be 
too significant to pass up.184 These savings are not trivial. It 
 
 181. See Brody, supra note 145, at 228 (“As health insurance costs continue 
to rise—when considering not just premiums but increasingly high deductibles, 
without equitable gains in income—the amount of money represented by thirty 
percent of self-only coverage becomes larger and larger, thus becoming more 
and more burdensome.”). 
 182. See supra notes 160–66 and accompanying text. 
 183. Bagenstos, supra note 143, at 96. 
 184. Id. Even $1875 can understate the amount of savings, given substantial 
differences in benefits costs based on geography and other factors. In fact, al-
most a fifth of workers pay over $7500 in self-only coverage, making the penalty 
they would pay for keeping information private at least $2250. Id. 
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could pay for two months’ rent, two months of childcare, or sev-
eral months’ worth of the average family’s groceries.185 Signifi-
cantly, the GINA rule clarified that the incentive under that rule 
could be in addition to the parallel ADA incentive, with the po-
tential cumulative effect “that the combined total inducement 
will be no more than twice the cost of 30 percent of self-only cov-
erage.”186 Thirty percent of this amount is $5,100, which could 
be extremely consequential savings for the many households 
earning less than $42,000 a year. PEWPA, as a statute, would 
adopt this limit and supersede any agency rules.187 
In addition to this financial impact, this incentive structure 
may have a particularly negative effect on older and less healthy 
people’s access to medical care. Perversely, a penalty for choos-
ing not to share genetic information with an employer could, in 
theory, backfire on the goals of a wellness program by “actually 
[limiting] people’s access to the medications and primary and 
preventive care they need to get and stay healthy” because they 
now have less money in their pocket to spend on these important 
items.188 As an official from the American Heart Association 
says, “When penalties become that high, it really is a deterrent 
to affordable, quality health care.”189 This was the concern in 
many comments the EEOC received before issuing the final 
rules. The agency refrained from addressing this issue, which 
the judge in the AARP case cited as a factor in his decision to 
vacate the rules.190 In bringing the suit on behalf of its members, 
the AARP was especially concerned with financial incentives’ ef-
fect on older employees as well. In a statement after the rules 
were issued, the organization said: 
Older workers, in particular, are more likely to have the very types of 
less visible medical conditions and disabilities—such as diabetes, heart 
disease, and cancer—that are at risk of disclosure by wellness ques-
 
 185. AARP v. EEOC, 267 F. Supp. 3d 14, 32–33 (D.D.C. 2017). 
 186. GINA Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,143, 31,146 (May 17, 2016) (to be codified 
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1635). 
 187. See Sun, supra note 134.  
 188. Michelle Andrews, EEOC Takes Aim at Wellness Programs Increasingly 
Offered by Employers, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Dec. 2, 2014), https://khn.org/ 
news/eeoc-takes-aim-at-wellness-programs-increasingly-offered-by-employers. 
 189. Id. 
 190. AARP, 267 F. Supp. at 33 (“The possibility that the ADA rule could dis-
proportionately harm the group the ADA is designed to protect would appear to 
pose a ‘significant problem.’”). 
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tionnaires and exams. . . . By financially coercing employees into sur-
rendering their personal health information, these rules will weaken 
medical privacy and civil rights protections.191 
So not only would employees with less financial resources be dis-
closing private information not entirely willingly, they are also 
left with less money in their pocket to potentially spend on im-
proving or maintaining their health. This impact is unfortunate 
because wellness programs’ primary targeted population is the 
sickest workers, who also tend to be the poorest.192 
B. ADDITIONAL ISSUES THAT ALTER PERCEPTION OF RISK AND 
HEIGHTEN PRIVACY CONCERNS 
While the Section above discusses how this incentive struc-
ture itself is coercive, there are two outside factors that exacer-
bate the unfairness of the “choice” employees make when faced 
with the decision to disclose genetic information. First, laypeo-
ple’s poor understanding of genetics creates greater risks of dis-
crimination, and second, data privacy concerns mean that em-
ployees’ information might be much less secure than they think 
it is. 
1. Misunderstanding of Genetic Science 
A problematic aspect of the coercion balancing framework is 
that because of common misunderstandings of genetic science, 
employees cannot fairly evaluate the risks and benefits of dis-
closing genetic information. The common belief in genetic deter-
minism—that genetics is responsible for almost everything 
about a person—can lead wellness program vendors and employ-
ers, if they obtain access to the information, to place too much 
significance on medical history and genes when evaluating em-
ployees. This view can thus overemphasize the perceived utility 
of this information in wellness programs193 and even result in 
discriminatory attitudes: 
A focus on genetics emphasizes racial and ethnic differences, a very 
sensitive matter both now and possibly in the future. Stressing the ge-
netics of race has the potential to intensify those divisions, while rein-
forcing the view that perceived differences are not mere accidents of 
 
 191. Appleby, supra note 108. 
 192. Horwitz et al., supra note 108, at 473. 
 193. See GRAEME LAURIE, GENETIC PRIVACY: A CHALLENGE TO MEDICO-LE-
GAL NORMS 97 (2002) (“Such a reductionist view sets too much store by the in-
fluence of genetics in the determination of human the condition . . . .”). 
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culture and circumstance but are grounded in biology, which is itself 
seen as somehow fundamental and unalterable.194 
The problem is that genetics predict far less about a person’s 
health risks than is commonly thought.195 For example, social 
conditions often predict health outcomes better than genetic 
data, and can even alter genetic expression.196 And yet, “the phe-
nomenon of the lay public acquiescing to an over-reliance on ge-
netic information without fully comprehending its complexity” 
can lead to the incorrect belief that genetics determines every-
thing, creating risks of genetic discrimination.197 Without the 
right expert guidance on interpreting this information, genetic 
tests results can even be dangerous.198 As Louise Slaughter, who 
spearheaded GINA through Congress, said, “Expecting human 
resources professionals to interpret a genetic test accurately is 
about as realistic as asking them to predict the weather for a 
particular city a year from that date.”199 This is especially trou-
blesome given the speed at which this field of technology is ad-
vancing,200 making it even more difficult to interpret this infor-
mation accurately according to current science. 
 
 194. Thomas H. Murray, Genetic Exceptionalism and “Future Diaries”: Is Ge-
netic Information Different from Other Medical Information?, in GENETIC SE-
CRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA, su-
pra note 25, at 60, 63.  
 195. Thomas H. Murray & Ross S. White, Genetic Privacy in the United 
States: Genetic Exceptionalism, GINA, and the Future of Genetic Testing, in GE-
NETIC PRIVACY: AN EVALUATION OF THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL LANDSCAPE 253, 
256 (Terry Sheung-Hung Kaan & Calvin Wal-Loon Ho eds., 2013) (“Recent stud-
ies suggest that information from multiple genetic variants does not necessarily 
provide a better prediction of diabetes risk than well-known risk factors such as 
age, body mass index, and sex, and is less predictive of coronary heart disease 
and cardiovascular events than factors such as age, blood pressure, triglycer-
ides, cigarette use, and diabetes.”). 
 196. See Ajunwa, Genetic Data, supra note 76, at 81; see also Craig Konnoth, 
Health Information Equity, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1317, 1360–61 (2017). 
 197. Ajunwa, Genetic Data, supra note 76, at 81. 
 198. Murray & White, supra note 195, at 257, 263 (describing studies of di-
rect-to-consumer genetics testing that reach incorrect and contradictory inter-
pretations about the same genes); see also Ajunwa, Genetic Data, supra note 76, 
at 84 (“Given the established sociological phenomena of genetic essentialism, 
genetic determinism, and genetic coercion, the government must intervene with 
stronger protections against genetic discrimination.”). 
 199. Slaughter, supra note 24, at 734. 
 200. The current Director of the National Institutes of Health—himself a 
physician-geneticist—stated that the field of genetics “is moving so quickly that 
any genetic risk predictions based on today’s understanding will need to be re-
vised in the context of new discoveries tomorrow.” Abrams & Garrett, supra 
note 10, at 767; Biographical Sketch of Francis S. Collins, M.D., Ph.D., NAT’L 
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Some scholars have argued that genetic information should 
not receive special protection for the very reason that genes say 
little about individuals compared to environmental and behav-
ioral factors.201 However, the common assumption of “immutable 
genetic risks” can be far from “obsolete” even when the science 
shows otherwise.202 In fact, while this assumption may have 
been even more dominant in the years leading up to GINA’s pas-
sage,203 PEWPA’s incentivizing disclosure, which “reeks of ge-
netic determinism,”204 shows that this notion is still prevalent. 
It is this very misunderstanding about how genetics works that 
should make lawmakers especially wary of financial incentives 
making employees susceptible to coercion,205 and is why PEWPA 
threatens to dramatically undercut GINA’s protections.206 
2. Data Privacy 
These concerns are exacerbated by the risk of private ge-
netic data falling into the wrong hands. The current rules do re-
quire employers to tell employees who has access to disclosed 
medical information, which in many cases is a third-party ven-
dor.207 They also mandate that a vendor share only aggregated 
data with the employer to avoid identifying individual employ-
ees.208 However, it seems far from guaranteed that the infor-
mation an employee discloses remains under lock and key that 
only a designated entity has access to—and even if it were, it 
would not be without concerns. Instead, most information today 
is susceptible to data breaches, and employees probably do not 
 
INSTS. HEALTH (June 27, 2017), https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/who-we-are/nih 
-director/biographical-sketch-francis-s-collins-md-phd. 
 201. Green et al., supra note 84, at 399; Murray, supra note 194, at 67. 
 202. See Green et al., supra note 84, at 399. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Ricki Lewis, Saving GINA: Is Genetic Privacy Imperiled?, PLOS BLOGS: 
DNA SCI. BLOG (Mar. 9, 2017), https://blogs.plos.org/dnascience/2017/03/09/ 
saving-gina-is-genetic-privacy-imperiled. 
 205. See McGregor, supra note 175, at 45 (“This model of coercion that fo-
cuses only on the notion of threats does not go far enough to capture cases where 
the victim’s vulnerability is taken advantage of to accomplish the coercion.”). 
See generally Lewis, supra note 204 (illustrating the problematic risks that a 
misunderstanding of genetic science poses in the context of wellness programs). 
 206. See Hudson & Pollitz, supra note 114, at 3 (“H.R. 1313 undermines the 
principle that genetic information needs the highest level of protection so that 
people can make decisions about obtaining their own information without fear-
ing that it might be used against them.”). 
 207. Appleby, supra note 108. 
 208. Id. 
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know how many unknown parties can lawfully access their well-
ness program data even when there is no breach.209 The reliance 
on third-party vendors “introduces an additional layer of regula-
tory complexity as vendors must coordinate their compliance ef-
forts with their employer-clients,”210 and with more complexity 
might come more opportunity for mistakes. This concern came 
out in the congressional testimony about the bill by Representa-
tive Sheila Jackson-Lee: 
While some of my colleagues are focused that GINA will provide further 
incentives and additional opportunities for litigation against employ-
ers, they seem to forget the very real concern of individual protections. 
In an age where electronic databases are easily tampered with and pri-
vate information is passed around like a bad cold, we must focus on the 
rights of individuals and their families when dealing with such a com-
plex and contentious issue.211 
In the decade since this testimony, the amount of American lives 
that resides online can only have increased, arguably presenting 
an even greater risk since GINA’s passage. In fact, “[c]onsumer 
and patient advocates note that wellness programs routinely ob-
tain passive authorization from participants to access further in-
formation about them, including claims and medical records 
data, and share it with their business partners.”212 Even if ven-
dors do not sell or share collected information, there is still a risk 
of data breaches. 
Unfortunately, research shows that “large databases con-
taining health information are an attractive target for hack-
ers.”213 One wellness vendor admits in the small print of its web-
site that it stores the data it gathers and can reuse it to perform 
research or sell it for profit, and that a number of different kinds 
 
 209. See generally Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Big Data and 
Consumer Privacy: Identifying Challenges, Finding Solutions, Address at 
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton, Univer-
sity (Feb. 20, 2014) (describing the vast extent of consumers’ information online 
and who has access to it, and the troubling implications this situation poses). 
 210. Alden J. Bianchi, The Emerging Contours of the Rules Governing Well-
ness Programs, 63 PRAC. L. 43, 44 (2017). 
 211. 154 CONG. REC. 5935, 7486 (2008) (statement of Rep. Sheila Jackson-
Lee). 
 212. Hudson & Pollitz, supra note 114, at 2. 
 213. Ifeoma Ajunwa, Workplace Wellness Programs Could Be Putting Your 
Health Data at Risk, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 19, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/01/ 
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example, “[s]ixty million Anthem policyholders were breached, a large wellness 
company called Staywell had a breach, and there have been 2.3 million reported 
instances of medical identify theft.” Lewis, supra note 172. 
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of people can have access to it.214 Even though the data is pur-
portedly anonymized, such a solution is not foolproof because 
“DNA can and has been re-identified,” according to a privacy ex-
pert.215 Allowing employers and wellness program vendors to ac-
cess such sensitive information legally might erode any confi-
dence employees have in the protection of their information 
because the law is failing to protect something it is supposed to 
protect, which in turn could deter positive wellness program out-
comes.216 Moreover, genetic testing can both help advance medi-
cal technology and lead to better individual health outcomes,217 
so practices that discourage such testing are in no one’s best in-
terests.218 
The significance imputed to genetic information and today’s 
widespread data privacy risks are more evidence that financial 
incentives can impermissibly distort the decision-making auton-
omy employees should have in this situation. Employees might 
not realize the dangers of data breaches their disclosures pose,219 
which would in fact increase the negative risks in Emanuel’s 
“undue inducement” equation.220 Other unknowns that are diffi-
cult to quantify but might make employees apprehensive about 
sharing genetic information concern the future risks and uses of 
this data that today is only speculative. Nancy Yue Liu refers to 
this possibility as “function creep.”221 In other words, genetic 
data could be used for purposes beyond that which it was in-
tended in the wellness program context. These speculative 
 
 214. Lewis, supra note 172. 
 215. Id. 
 216. See Brill, supra note 209. 
 217. See Roberts, Genetic Information, supra note 54, at 605. 
 218. Cf. Steven Greenhouse, Ex-Worker Says Her Firing Was Based on Ge-
netic Test, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/01/us/ 
01gene.html (recounting how, if a woman claiming her firing was because she 
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health”). 
 219. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
 220. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
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LENGE OF BIOMETRICS 66 (2012) (“[T]he potential of biometric data cannot be 
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TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 4 (“It is this interpretive potential of genetic data that 
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regarding its access and use.”). 
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harms might be difficult to grasp,222 so when there is a financial 
reward hinging on disclosure, these risks can also be easy to ig-
nore or underestimate.223 They suggest coercion because they 
“[undermine] the freedom of the [employee] and [render] his or 
her consent invalid.”224 All of these problems indicate the lack of 
voluntariness involved in this incentive structure, which is di-
rectly contrary to GINA’s wellness program exception and points 
to the need for a new rulemaking to prohibit financial rewards 
of any amount. 
III.  THE AGENCY AND CONGRESS SHOULD READ GINA’S 
“VOLUNTARY” EXCEPTION AS FORECLOSING ANY 
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES   
Given the problems outlined above, this Part recommends 
that a financial incentive of any kind is inappropriate for em-
ployees’ disclosure of genetic information. While, in theory, a ten 
percent level is more acceptable than a thirty percent level, the 
very idea of a monetary reward—or penalty, depending on one’s 
view—linked with such fundamentally private information as 
genetics is antithetical to the spirit of GINA and today’s signifi-
cant concerns about data privacy.225 Now that the EEOC’s rules 
have been vacated, it should issue a new rule that expressly pro-
hibits any kind of financial incentive for employees to disclose 
genetic information through wellness programs, as it originally 
did in 2010. The agency should read GINA’s text strictly to allow 
“voluntary” disclosures, uncompromised by offering financial in-
centives. First, financial incentives are incompatible with the 
statute’s intent to promote genetic privacy. While a categorical 
prohibition on such incentives may seem far-reaching, this solu-
tion is consistent with the expansive privacy and antidiscrimi-
nation protection that GINA represents, as well as with the 
ACA’s purpose of broadening access to healthcare. This breadth 
 
 222. Barbara Sandfuchs, Privacy Nudges: An Introduction, in PROTECTING 
THE GENETIC SELF FROM BIOMETRIC THREATS: AUTONOMY, IDENTITY, AND GE-
NETIC PRIVACY 256, 259 (Christina M. Akrivopoulou ed., 2015) (“Citizens may 
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 224. See McGregor, supra note 175, at 49. 
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under GINA and applicable regulations. 
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is also necessary in order to avoid the problems arising under 
the 2016 rule’s application to the genetic information of employ-
ees’ spouses. Next, the practical effect of making these disclo-
sures strictly optional under a zero-incentive rule could actually 
make wellness programs more successful in improving employee 
health. Finally, this solution would lead to much needed legal 
certainty in this area for employers because of the EEOC’s am-
biguous position after the recent AARP ruling. 
A. GENETIC INFORMATION, PRIVACY, AND STATUTORY PURPOSE 
Perhaps just as problematic as the discriminatory use of ge-
netic data is simply the idea that an employer could have access 
to an employee’s genetic test results or spouse’s family medical 
history. Congress recognized this concern in formulating GINA 
as a hybrid antidiscrimination and privacy law. Prohibiting fi-
nancial incentives would be in keeping with legal theories of pri-
vacy as applied to genetics and would advance GINA’s broad pur-
pose. 
1. Financial Incentives’ Inconsistency with Genetic Privacy 
Even though genes predict far less than many people as-
sume, they are still intimately tied to our conceptions of our-
selves.226 The very idea of DNA is thought to be fundamental to 
one’s identity, forms connections to family members and long-
ago ancestors, and simply “helps us conceptualize the person as 
a person.”227 Anita Allen describes genetic privacy as connected 
to all four kinds of privacy the law is concerned with: informa-
tional privacy (access to personal information), physical privacy 
(one’s physical bodily integrity), decisional privacy (the interfer-
ence of government and third parties with individual decision-
making), and proprietary privacy (the possession and rights of 
the “owner” of information).228 Traditionally, physical privacy 
has been most fraught in search and seizure law related to inva-
sive procedures such as drug testing and body cavity searches, 
as well as in mandatory immunizations laws.229 By now though, 
 
 226. See, e.g., LAURIE, supra note 193, at 90 (“Exposure to [knowledge of 
one’s genetics] can alter self-perception and challenge notions of identity.”). 
 227. See Konnoth, supra note 196, at 1341–42 (“Indeed, genetic data is pop-
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 228. Anita L. Allen, Genetic Privacy: Emerging Concepts and Values, in GE-
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 229. LIU, supra note 221, at 72. 
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“DNA is an emerging area in this field,” indicating that society’s 
view of genetics is so fundamental as to “[transcend] the physi-
cal” and encompass “the dignity of the human person.”230 “[T]he 
idea of the human body as an inviolate entity is now common in 
the laws of Western states,” so DNA fits neatly in with these val-
ues.231 
It is true that the meaning of one’s genetics and the desire 
for privacy might vary tremendously from person to person. Like 
coercion, privacy is thus an inherently normative concept, which 
makes evaluating whether an offer is truly voluntary more com-
plicated.232 One employee may be comfortable broadcasting their 
entire family medical history to managers at work and all over 
social media, while a colleague would prefer to not even learn 
about their own genetics let alone tell others this information. 
Disconnecting any financial reward from this practice would re-
spect everyone’s diverse tolerances for privacy. As Mark Taylor 
states: 
Privacy protection is about maintaining these highly variable norms: 
both protecting the states of separation they represent and enabling 
the access that they expect. When there are different norms in play, 
then regulation must seek to account reasonably for them all in a pro-
cess that determines which has priority in any case of conflict.233 
Here, the law should prioritize the privacy concern because the 
benefit of the alternative—the wellness program having access 
to genetic information—is not worth the cost in lost privacy.234 
This normative nature of privacy also relates to the desire not to 
discover one’s genetic information. Right or wrong, it is easy to 
attach special significance to inherited diseases; learning one’s 
genetic predisposition can have negative effects on all aspects of 
a person’s life.235 Because of the intensely personal and high-
stakes nature of genetic test results, learning about this infor-
mation through a wellness program should be strictly voluntary 
and free of financial influence.236 These complicating factors 
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ed., 2015). 
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make even a middle-ground incentive model that one scholar 
proposes inadequate. Elizabeth Brown suggests that “regulators 
instead might compare the cost of the incentive to the employee’s 
net income” instead of to the cost of overall coverage.237 While 
this solution might be less harmful on its face in terms of eco-
nomic impact on employees, these privacy concerns are still pre-
sent and problematic. 
This Note does not attempt to argue in favor of genetic ex-
ceptionalism, which proposes that genetics is so different from 
other health-related information that it should receive more pro-
tection.238 It would be unfair and overly simplistic to view an em-
ployer knowing or acting upon an employee’s family medical his-
tory as categorically worse than doing so based on an employee’s 
manifested disease or disability. As Murray and White point out, 
why should a predictive medical test—such as cholesterol evalu-
ation—be treated differently than a test for a gene suggesting a 
higher risk of breast cancer?239 While there are compelling argu-
ments that federal law should protect employees against medical 
discrimination beyond what the ADA covers,240 such concerns 
are outside the scope of this Note. Instead, this Note simply 
seeks to show that genetic information’s unique challenges re-
garding privacy in the employment context are sufficient to pro-
hibit any financial incentives in exchange for this data. 
2. Consistency with GINA’s Broad Purpose 
Interpreting “voluntary” to prohibit financial incentives 
would be consistent with Congress’s intent to ensure genetic pri-
vacy, assuage the public’s fears, and further scientific research 
by enacting GINA. As Mark Taylor explains, “It is important 
 
for You, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/ 
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2018] PRIVACY & WORKPLACE WELLNESS 1127 
 
that genetic data is seen to be subject to appropriate privacy pro-
tection for the sake of those who rely upon participants’ trust in 
the security and integrity of the research process.”241 The under-
standing that this kind of information receives sufficient protec-
tion could provide benefits on an individual level—by not dis-
couraging people to undergo potentially helpful genetic tests—
as well as on a macro level through advancing scientific re-
search.242 Alleviating fear about who can access this sensitive 
information was a central reason for enacting GINA,243 so chip-
ping away at the federal floor of protection GINA offers is harm-
ful. In fact, only forty-one percent of employees agree to disclose 
health information to large employers who have health-contin-
gent wellness plans because they fear a lack of privacy, discrim-
ination, and sharing of information with unauthorized par-
ties.244 
A broad reading of GINA’s “voluntary” language to foreclose 
any financial incentives would also be consistent with the signif-
icance of the statute at the time of its enactment. Until 2008, 
while many states did have some kind of genetic privacy or anti-
discrimination laws, their scope of protection was comparatively 
minimal. Most were limited to the health insurance—not em-
ployment—context, and only applied to genetic test results, not 
family medical histories.245 Some were so narrow as to only con-
cern the sickle-cell gene.246 While European countries were, and 
still are, grappling with similar questions about how to protect 
genetic privacy, the need for an inclusive federal law in the U.S. 
was particularly great because Americans receive health insur-
ance from their employers.247 While there are multiple ways to 
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define genetic information, GINA took the broadest approach by 
including family medical history.248 GINA was evidently meant 
to signify a substantial step forward in the law of genetic privacy 
and discrimination, so PEWPA’s codification and expansion of 
the “voluntary” exception would represent a major step back. 
A zero-incentive rule would not only be consistent with 
GINA’s purpose but also with the spirit of the ACA. Because the 
ACA was meant to level the playing field in terms of access to 
healthcare, making employees pay more for coverage in ex-
change for keeping information related to their family’s genetics 
and health private creates inequality in terms of privacy rights. 
President Obama himself, champion of the ACA, has recognized 
the importance of “an autonomy-based ownership understand-
ing of information,” stating, “[O]nce you understand [that the 
data is] yours, . . . you have agency in the process.”249 It should 
not be the case that affluent workers can choose more privacy 
because they find paying more in premiums acceptable, while it 
is much harder for lower-income people to maintain that same 
privacy when the financial reward would make a meaningful dif-
ference in their budget.250 A zero-incentive rule would actually 
grant employees agency over this information. 
That the EEOC’s 2016 rule only applied to manifested dis-
eases in employees’ spouses251 does not make such an incentive 
scheme acceptable and illustrates why a categorical prohibition 
on financial incentives is the solution that is more consistent 
with GINA’s intent. The reasoning for the rule’s narrow scope is 
that because employees and their spouses do not share genetic 
information, “the spouse’s disease history is unlikely to enable 
discrimination against the employee on the basis of her genetic 
information.”252 In addition, employers do have a stake in 
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spouses’ health when spouses are covered by the employer’s 
health plan.253 However, this “clarification” seems to contradict 
both the text and purpose of GINA.254 The purpose of including 
a spouse’s information in GINA’s definition of “genetic infor-
mation” was to prevent increased health insurance costs based 
on the status of any dependents on the plan—even though an 
employee and their spouse do not share the same genetic infor-
mation.255 Moreover, the line between manifested diseases and 
pure genetic information that GINA attempts to draw is not al-
ways clear, so knowing a spouse’s medical history could actually 
be the same as knowing their genetic information.256 
This limitation is not harmless. The genetic background of 
an employee’s spouse—which may be disclosed—would typically 
also reveal genetic information about the employee’s children—
whose disclosure of information is not allowed.257 As Bahrad So-
khansanj writes, “Most critically, compromises to genetic pri-
vacy affect family members as much as they do the individual 
who has either consented to the release of their genetic infor-
mation or participated in a study that releases genetic infor-
mation.”258 Some of the comments to the proposed 2016 rule even 
noted that allowing this disclosure could lead to conflict within 
families when an employee and spouse disagree about whether 
to avoid a penalty by providing the spouse’s genetic infor-
mation.259 This situation cannot be dismissed on the basis of be-
ing too narrow and theoretical. In fact, one study found that 
three quarters of employers who offer health assessment and 
management programs include spouses in their plans.260 More 
specifically, in the AARP case, the judge’s finding of standing 
was partly based on one of the plaintiffs’ spouses being affected 
by the employer’s new wellness plan.261 More broadly, allowing 
 
 253. Id. 
 254. See 42 U.S.C. 2000ff(3) (2012). 
 255. AARP v. EEOC, 267 F. Supp. 3d 14, 34–35 (D.D.C. 2017). 
 256. Ajunwa, Genetic Data, supra note 76, at 94 (“[S]ome diseases are 
strictly genetic in nature or have strong genetic correlations, such that a mani-
fested condition is evidence of the presence of a mutated gene.”). 
 257. McIntyre et al., supra note 93, at 76. 
 258. Sokhansanj, supra note 25, at 309. 
 259. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,143, 
31,153 (May 17, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1635). 
 260. Barbara J. Zabawa, The AARP v. EEOC Case and GINA, WELLNESS 
COUNCIL AM. (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.welcoa.org/blog/aarp-v-eeoc-case 
-gina. 
 261. AARP v. EEOC, 267 F. Supp. 3d 14, 23–26 (D.D.C. 2017). 
  
1130 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:1089 
 
the employee to disclose their non-employee spouse’s infor-
mation not only seems to insert troubling questions into a cou-
ple’s private relationship but also contradicts the spirit of GINA 
to provide broad genetic privacy protections in health insurance 
and employment, contexts in which this situation squarely falls. 
B. A STRICT READING OF “VOLUNTARY” MIGHT INCREASE 
WELLNESS PROGRAMS’ EFFECTIVENESS 
Prohibiting financial incentives for genetic information 
would far from doom employers’ well-intentioned wellness pro-
grams. In fact, a rule that interprets “voluntary” strictly might 
actually be a positive development for both employees and em-
ployers, especially in the midst of bleak research about wellness 
programs’ low success rates.262 To effectively carry out the ACA’s 
mandate of improving employee health and decreasing 
healthcare costs, wellness programs need to focus on engaging 
employees.263 Awareness of certain risks from learning one’s ge-
netic information could be used to tie health outcomes to finan-
cial incentives, which “reframes health and bodily integrity as 
an obligation owed from the worker to the employer.”264 In con-
trast, meaningfully engaging with the possible implications of 
genetic test results might be more likely—and thus more likely 
to lead to better health outcomes—if employees volunteered to 
learn about this information free of any monetary reward.265 It 
would still be unlawful for employers to make decisions based on 
this volunteered data, as GINA prohibits such discriminatory ac-
tions even when they are based on information lawfully acquired 
through one of the statute’s enumerated exceptions.266 GINA’s 
confidentiality provisions would still apply to this data as well.267 
Making this testing fully optional would not necessarily 
mean that no employee would participate. In fact, one study 
found that healthy people were more likely to obtain long-term 
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care insurance if their genetic tests revealed higher-risk re-
sults,268 suggesting that people could be genuinely interested in 
learning and acting upon this information. However, the burden 
should be on the employer—or wellness program vendor—to ex-
plain the value of this opportunity. As the American Heart As-
sociation’s director of policy research said, “The incentives are 
meant to engage employees . . . but they’re not the comprehen-
sive programming we’d like to see employers offer.”269 From this 
perspective, whether an employee can receive a five or fifty per-
cent discount is irrelevant—the incentive does not actually solve 
anything.270 Strictly voluntary participation in a genetic compo-
nent of a program could play an important role in giving employ-
ees autonomy and making them feel as if wellness programming 
is “done for employees” rather than “done to [them].”271 
C. LOOKING AHEAD: A ZERO-INCENTIVE RULE AND LEGAL 
CLARITY 
Finally, a rule clarifying that GINA’s “voluntary” require-
ment prohibits any kind of financial incentive would have the 
advantage of bringing legal certainty to this area for employers. 
Because part of the impetus for the 2016 EEOC rules was to clar-
ify what kind of incentives GINA allowed, their impending vaca-
tur will likely cause some confusion until the agency can finalize 
new rules,272 especially for those employers with “mid-year 
plans” that started on July 1 rather than January 1.273 In its 
March 2018 status report submitted to the court, the EEOC took 
a position that provided no real guidance. The agency stated it 
 
 268. Green et al., supra note 84, at 399. 
 269. Andrews, supra note 188. 
 270. See Bagenstos, supra note 143, at 92 (“It is the structure of the incen-
tive, not the size, that matters.”). 
 271. See Lewis, supra note 1 (emphasis added); see also Hull & Pasquale, 
supra note 95, at 200 (stating that wellness programs “present an exercise of 
power of employer over employee, one that attempts to push a rebranding of the 
reluctant”). 
 272. Ice Miller Employee Benefits Team, Court Ruling Creates New Incen-
tive for Wellness Programs, COLUMBUS BUS. FIRST (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www 
.bizjournals.com/columbus/news/2018/03/07/court-ruling-creates-new 
-uncertainties-for.html. For legal opinions illustrating just how ambiguous this 
situation is for employers, see Legal Alert: EEOC’s Status Report in AARP v. 
EEOC Creates Uncertainty for Wellness Programs, JA COUNTER (Apr. 17, 2018), 
https://jacounter.com/legal-alert-eeocs-status-report-aarp-v-eeoc-creates 
-uncertainty-wellness-programs; Barbara J. Zabawa, Tips for Employers with 
Mid-Year Plans Post AARP v. EEOC, WELLNESS COUNCIL AM. (May 16, 2018), 
https://www.welcoa.org/blog/tips-employers-mid-year-plans-post-aarp-v-eeoc. 
 273. Zabawa, supra note 260. 
  
1132 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:1089 
 
had no plans to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking soon, “but 
it also has not ruled out the possibility that it may issue such a 
Notice in the future.”274 The upside to this uncertainty is that it 
might push employers away from the model of financial incen-
tives for health assessments, and toward offerings based around 
health education that do not involve inquiries into personal in-
formation like genetic background.275 
Even if the agency did issue a Notice soon, it is unlikely the 
new rules would be finalized until late 2019, and would not go 
into effect until one or two years later.276 When proposing new 
rules, the EEOC would ideally heed the judge’s implicit warning 
in his opinion vacating the rules. When reconsidering the rem-
edy for his earlier ruling that found the rules arbitrary and ca-
pricious under Chevron but nevertheless left them in place, he 
implied that once the agency reevaluates the question of an ac-
ceptable incentive level, “it is far from clear that the EEOC will 
view a 30% incentive level as sufficiently voluntary,” and its de-
cision “may very well be different on remand.”277 It is not neces-
sary to go as far as amending GINA itself, which does not say 
anything about incentive levels at all. On its face, there is noth-
ing wrong with the statute’s exception for employers to acquire 
the genetic information of employees who “voluntary[ily]” au-
thorize it as part of a wellness program.278 Given that the pur-
pose of such a rulemaking would simply clarify a statutory term 
and PEWPA has indicated Congress’s inclination to move in the 
other direction, a regulation promulgated by the EEOC would be 
sufficient. Because of the significant coercion and privacy con-
cerns outlined above, the agency should issue a new proposed 
rule soon that would expressly forbid any kind of financial incen-
tive for GINA-protected information. 
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CONCLUSION 
The problem of genetic privacy in wellness programs is at 
the intersection of many issues: the legacy of the history of ge-
netic discrimination, a unique preemptive antidiscrimination 
law, the incredibly complex regulation of healthcare, socioeco-
nomic inequality, workers’ rights, and corporate and political in-
terests. While genetic information gathering is admittedly a 
small aspect of wellness programs, it raises significant privacy 
concerns. Even if it is not common practice that employers ask 
workers about their family medical histories and try to reward 
them for such disclosures, a prohibition on these incentives are 
at least an important preventative step, just as GINA was for 
the phenomenon of genetic discrimination. Tightening privacy 
rights in this narrow context could even represent a significant 
step toward progress in heightening privacy protection in well-
ness programs generally.279 Given the powerful forces represent-
ing business interests and supporting PEWPA that oppose 
heightened regulations and advocate greater freedom for em-
ployers, the timeliness of resolving this issue is high. Absent 
PEWPA’s enactment and thus stripping of the EEOC’s enforce-
ment power, the agency now has an opportunity in the wake of 
the AARP ruling to take a firm stance against financial incen-
tives for disclosing GINA-protected information. Such a position 
might be the beginning of a needed shift in wellness program 
policy. 
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